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1. The notion that ‘caste’ and ‘class’ constitute opposing or alternative ways of 
analysing Indian politics and society is misplaced. They are different kinds of 
categories. In a sense ‘caste’ is inherently emic; ‘class’ is an etic category ... an 
observer’s category but one that may also be meaningful to actors’ themselves 
(class-in-itself/for-itself). Both caste and class matter in Indian society; and it has 
often been noted that there is a broad overlap between them. This is unsurprising 
since caste constitutes a kind of cultural capital and may give rise to significant 
social capital, both of which play an important part in the reproduction of class 
differentiation. e.g (i) Fuller on Tamil Brahmins: realisation that his study of 
Tamil Brahmins in the C20 is actually a study of the formation of a middle class 
which is disproportionately but not exclusively Brahmin. TamBrams have 
cumulative advantages in making their way as middle class people by virtue of 
the cultural and social capital that they have at their disposal . (ii) Jeffrey on the 
significance of Jat identity in the reproduction of the class structure of western 
UP, partly having effect through education. 
 
2. Note, historically, the overlap of caste and class in the phenomenon of 
‘landlordism’. Thought within the Congress before 1947, and in the Report of the 
Agrarian Reforms Committee that reported in 1949 to be at the core of India’s 
‘agrarian question’; and still is by both CPI(M) and by CPI(Maoist). Control over 
land  control over people; and both are secured by caste dominance. Note (i) 
that anthropologists such, notably, as Dirks and Raheja, see the locally dominant 
castes – dominant by virtue of their control over land and people - as being, 
structurally, in the position of ‘little kings’, and at the centre of the caste system 
(rather than Brahmins). Note (ii) that locally dominant landholders/members of 
locally dominant castes became very influential in Congress especially (from the 
1930s, and increasingly so after 1947), and in some other political parties (BKD 
etc). The ‘landlords’ of the colonial period were seriously weakened through 
zamindari abolition, but there is strong evidence that those who benefited most 
from this were the rich peasants (substantial former occupancy tenants in some 
cases). Based on their control of land they were key actors in what Thorner 
referred to as ‘the depressor’ (which was his insightful way of modelling 
landlordism and its effects).  As the class of ‘rich peasants’/landed proprietors 
seen as one of the competing dominant proprietary classes in e.g Bardhan’s 
model of India’s political economy. But what has happened to ‘landlordism’ now?  
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Though there certainly are instances – as in the village of Iruvelpattu in Tamil 
Nadu – of the survival of big landlords, reflecting the general failure of 
redistributivist land reform in India, there is surely good reason for questioning 
the extent to which ‘landlordISM’ remains significant. This is because of the 
development of capitalist agriculture (contra the model of semi-feudalism); the 
fragmentation of large landholdings through inheritance and in response to the 
threats of land reform legislation; and because of the impact of social and 
political change on caste dominance (the processes that Manor emphasises in his 
‘Caste and Politics in Recent Times’; and Dipankar Gupta in his idea of the 
‘disappearing village’). And yet we should not underestimate the extent to which 
the power of locally dominant castes, historically based substantially on control 
over land, continues to be reproduced. Local power holders have often been 
adroit at hanging onto their power, in spite of the declining significance of land, 
perhaps notably through their roles as ‘gatekeepers’ between people and the state 
(and perhaps still, in some cases, as controllers of vote blocs?).  See Pattenden on 
dominant proprietors in Karnataka; Jeffrey again on the Jats of western UP. How 
far have those whom Krishna describes as ‘naya netas’ or Manor as small-time 
fixers, succeeded in displacing those who have historically been the local bosses? 
‘Landlordism’, maybe, and historical caste dominance, have substantially passed, 
but isn’t it the case that, in many parts of rural India, those who were the 
‘landlords’ still exercise local power, with important consequences still for state-
level politics (even if the power of the class of landed elites in relation to that of 
the other two dominant proprietary classes in Bardhan’s model is no longer as 
great as it was)? These are significant empirical questions. 
 
3. There is a further point here. Even if local ‘caste systems’ have substantially 
broken down, hierarchical ideology is surely alive and well. This seems to be 
shown, for example, in Corbridge et al’s observations of how people ‘see the 
state’.  Pratap Mehta’s argument is that in the context of an historically 
hierarchical society (India’s ‘ancien regime’ as he puts it) the impact of electoral 
democracy is to see different social groups competing for position rather than 
pursuing agendas of societal transformation. 
 
4. In earlier work I drew on the overlaps of caste and class to distinguish between 
the political regimes of the major states. I distinguished between (i) those states 
(UP and Bihar) in which upper caste dominance has been significantly challenged 
and in which the centrality of the Congress party has been displaced as party 
competition has become quite fragmented; (ii) states in which upper caste/class 
dominance has not yet been so significantly challenged, and where there is two-
party competition between Congress and another major party (MP, Rajasthan, 
Orissa); (iii) states in which what have usually been described as ‘middle castes’ 
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of (historically) big landholders are politically dominant (Punjab, Haryana, 
Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra, Karnataka), and where (in most cases) there is 
now two-party competition between Congress and another major party; (iv) 
states in which lower castes/classes have been mobilised politically and 
‘dominance’ substantially weakened (Kerala, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal). I have 
found that in regard to provision of social welfare the last group of states has 
generally done better than others, including wealthier and more rapidly growing 
states. Governments in these states have generally – not invariably – been more 
responsive to poorer working people (and where else is there comparable 
evidence of government responsiveness to lower class/caste people? MP and 
Rajasthan, latterly?). I think that this typology of state political regimes still has 
analytical traction. If this is so does it not suggest – as I have also argued in the 
preceding points – that for all the ‘decline of dominance’ (Frankel and Rao) not 
only do caste blocs, overlapping as they do with class differences, remain key 
parameters of Indian politics but hierarchy remains remarkably resilient over 
much of the country. 
 
5. What may be an important field for future research is that of the relationships 
between caste differences, economically dominant classes and political elites. E.g 
? difference between Andhra and Tamil Nadu? In Andhra historically dominant 
castes, Kammas and Reddys, substantially constitute both the political elite, and 
also competing fractions of the capitalist class. In Tamil Nadu political elites and 
capital – historically dominated by Brahmins and Chettiars - have remained 
largely apart from each other (though latterly political power has increasingly 




A further note on Manor’s reflections on de Swaan’s concept of a 
‘Social Consciousness’  
 
I wish that I felt as positive as James Manor evidently does about the extent to 
which the ‘moral stance’ that ‘entails a sense of generalised responsibility’ has 
come to be accepted in India. At least in this note Manor recognises the 
deepening inequalities in Indian society of the last decade or so in a way that he 
does not, I think, in his ‘Caste and Politics in Recent Times. But I believe that he 
seriously underestimates the extent of resistance on the part of political elites to 
social reform and to programmes for the reduction/elimination of poverty. Sure, 
increasing tax revenues have made possible increased expenditure on social 
welfare, but: (i) the successive UPA governments have not met the targets to 
which a commitment was made in the Common Minimum Programme in 2004 
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in regard to expenditure on education and health, as a share of GDP, and in many 
of their policies have encouraged privatisation of these critically important 
services; (ii) it must be noted that the NREGA was only passed in its present form 
after a great deal of pressure from lobby groups in civil society, and more recently 
the unwillingness of government even to pay legislated minimum wages to 
workers employed under the Act is a testament to its continuing reluctance in 
regard to the programme; (iii) the government has very deliberately shelved the 
recommendations of the National Commission on Enterprises in the 
Unorganised Sector, and we know from those who were members of the 
Commission how unhappy senior ministers, including the Prime Minister, were 
about them; (iv) most recently the government has shown considerable 
reluctance to implement commitments that were made to ensuring food security 
for the people. In these, and in other ways, I believe that many leading members 
of India’s political elites do not show a strong commitment to the moral stance 
that de Swaan refers to as ‘social consciousness. There certainly are strong 
indications of the existence of such a consciousness amongst some members of 
the middle classes (those who have driven the Campaign for the Right to Food 
and other such campaigns for the realisation of economic and social rights). But 
the middle classes are ‘not unalloyed carriers of virtue’ (Mehta), and others from 
these classes, for example, use public interest litigation to criminalise slum 
dwellers  and to tackle urban poverty by removing the poor from the cities (as in 
Mumbai’s ‘tsunami’ of early 2005). I have noted above my view that even if the 
power of caste hierarchies has declined, hierarchical values and ideas that are 
antithetical to the sort of social consciousness that de Swaan describes, remain 
powerful.     
     
     
